

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00035 01 OF 04 071038Z

12

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 065777

P R 070940Z FEB 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 826

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0035

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT ONLY TO NATO DEPT.,
TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: POLISH PRESENTATION AT FEB 6
PLENARY SESSION

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE FEBRUARY 6 PLENARY MEETING
OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, THE ONLY STATEMENT WAS PRE-
SENTED BY THE POLISH REP (STRULAK), WHO IN A STANDARD
BUT RATHER SHARPLY WORDED PRESENTATION OF THE EASTERN
POSITION, STRESSED THAT ALL PROPOSALS MUST COMPLY WITH
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00035 01 OF 04 071038Z

THE "TWO BASIC CRITERIA" OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY

AND EQUIVALENCE OF OBLIGATIONS.

IN BRIEFLY REVIEWING THE EASTERN NOV 8 DRAFT AGREEMENT, FIRST STEP AND FREEZE PROPOSALS, STRULAK ONCE AGAIN SOUGHT TO EMPHASIZE THE EASTERN COMMITMENT TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. HE CALLED FOR REDUCTIONS OF GROUND AS WELL AS AIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

2. THE POLISH REP ROUNDLY CRITICIZED THE WESTERN POSITION, TERMING IT "TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE." HE SAID THE COMMON CEILING WAS A "DECEITFUL" CONCEPT AIMED AT GAINING WESTERN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES. (AS OFTEN THE CASE WITH STRULAK, THE STATEMENT WAS WRITTEN AND PRESENTED IN ENGLISH WITH SOME INACCURACIES OF PHRASING; THE INTENDED WORD HERE MAY HAVE BEEN "DECEPTIVE" RATHER THAN DECEITFUL.)

3. STRULAK DEMANDED REDUCTIONS BY ALL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND PRECISE COMMITMENTS AS TO "WHOSE AND WHAT FORCES ARE TO BE REDUCED AND WHEN," SAYING THAT, UNTIL SUCH COMMITMENTS ARE SPELLED OUT, "THERE IS NO USE IN PERSUADING US THAT OUR CONCERNS HAVE BEEN MET HALF WAY." STRULAK ASSERTED THAT NATO WAS TAKING STEPS TO INCREASE THE FRG FORCES. IN CRITICIZING MODIFICATIONS OF THE WESTERN POSITION, STRULAK WELCOMED "SIGNS... WHICH PROMISE TO EXTEND FUTURE WESTERN COMMITMENTS TO THE COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THE GROUND FORCES," BUT ADDED THAT THE WESTERN AIR NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH AND WOULD NOT PREVENT A GROWTH IN COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF AIR FORCES.

3. THE TEXT OF THE POLISH STATEMENT FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

DISTINGUISHED DELEGATES,

1. IT IS CERTAINLY A POSITIVE ACCORD THAT BOTH SPEAKERS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00035 01 OF 04 071038Z

AT THE LAST MEETING WHICH OPENED THE FIFTH ROUND OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS EXPRESSED THE DESIRE AND EXPECTATION OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE TALKS TO SEE AN EARLY PROGRESS IN THE FULFILLMENT OF OUR TASK HERE WHICH IS TO AGREE ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

2. IT IS BUT NATURAL THAT EVERY PARTY TO THIS IMPORTANT FORUM SHOULD SHARE THE HIGH RESPONSIBILITY IMPOSED BY THE

STEADFASTLY GROWING PROCESS OF POLITICAL DETENTE IN EUROPE, IN PARTICULAR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO CONSOLIDATE AND STIMULATE THIS PROCESS BY SUPPLEMENTING IT WITH ADEQUATE MEASURES OF MILITARY DETENTE.

3. IN 1975 WE EXPECT NOT MERE REPETITION OF KNOWN FORMULAE OF COEXISTENCE AND DETENTE, BUT A CONSIDERABLE MEASURE OF THE EFFECTIVE PROGRESS AND FINALIZATION OF THE ENDEAVOURS BEGUN SOME TIME AGO. SUCH DEVELOPMENT WOULD INDEED BE A MOST WORTHY WAY TO CELEBRATE THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HISTORICAL VICTORY OVER GERMAN FASCISM. IT IS CERTAINLY WITHIN OUR CAPABILITY TO MAKE OUR OWN CONTRIBUTION HERE TO THIS DEVELOPMENT.

4. MY DELEGATION ONCE AGAIN WISHES TO PUT ON RECORD POLAND'S UNSWERVING SUPPORT, TOGETHER WITH OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, FOR EVERY EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROCESS OF DETENTE, NOTWITHSTANDING DIFFICULTIES IT ENCOUNTERS, WILL CONTINUE TO FAVOUR THE PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND, AS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE, WILL GO ON PROVIDING ALL INCENTIVES REQUIRED FOR DIMINISHING THE HIGH CONCENTRATION OF ARMS AND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THUS PERMITTING TO FULFILL THE OBJECTIVES OF THE VIENNA TALKS.

5. IN OUR VIEW, THE PROGRESS IN THE TALKS IS NOT ONLY DESIRED BUT POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, THE COURSE OF ALMOST TWO YEARS OF OUR DEBATES HAS SHOWN THAT SOLUTIONS WHICH WILL LEAD US TO A COMMON UNDERSTANDING MUST ANSWER TWO BASIC CRITERIA:

- THE OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED;
- THE ALREADY AGREED AND COMMONLY ACKNOWLEDGED PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY WHICH CALLS FOR EQUIVALENCE OF OBLIGATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00035 01 OF 04 071038Z

6. THE CORRECTNESS OF THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON AT THE PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS IS CONSTANTLY REASSERTING ITSELF.

7. THE OBJECTIVE WAY OF JUDGING THE VALUE OF PROGRAMMES FOR REDUCTION, OF ALL PROPOSALS PERTAINING TO OUR SUBJECT-MATTER, IS TO SCRUTINIZE THEM AGAINST THE ABOVE MENTIONED CRITERIA. THESE CRITERIA ARE FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN EACH OF THE 3 PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE 4 SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00035 02 OF 04 071049Z

11

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 065887

P R 070940Z FEB 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0827

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0035

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT ONLY TO NATO DEPT,
TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

8. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973 OF COURSE PROVIDES FOR THE MOST COMPLETE REDUCTION PROGRAMME, MOST ADEQUATE TO THE NEEDS OF THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILS OF THIS DRAFT, LET ME SAY HERE IN ALL SINCERITY THAT THE ONLY WAY TO CARRY OUT SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN THIS SENSITIVE AREA IS, AS THE DRAFT PROVIDES, TO DO SO WITHOUT INFRINGING UPON THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF MILITARY POTENTIALS.

9. ANY PROPOSITION TO ALTER THE ESTABLISHED CORRELATION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00035 02 OF 04 071049Z

IS NOT ONLY UNREALISTIC BUT HAS TO BE CONSIDERED AS TENDING TO BRING ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MAY TURN OUT TO BE DANGEROUS.

10. IT IS THE EXISTING REALITY WHICH REQUIRES THAT THE PARTIES REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN PROPORTION TO THEIR STRENGTH IN THE AREA. IT IS THE SAME REALITY WHICH DICTATES COVERING BY REDUCTIONS ALL MAIN COMPONENTS OF MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE AREA, I.E., GROUND AS WELL AS AIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ALONG WITH THE UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

11. THE EXISTING STATE OF AFFAIRS AND THE SENSE OF SECURITY ALSO REQUIRES THAT ALL STATES HAVING FORCES IN THE AREA SHOULD UNDERTAKE CLEAR-CUT REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS, AND BE EVENTUALLY BOUND BY THEM.

12. I SHOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THESE BASIC REQUIREMENTS, EMBODIED IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE FOUR-POWER DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973, ARE FUNDAMENTAL NOT ONLY TO OUR BUT TO GENERAL SECURITY IN THE AREA AND IN EUROPE. WE STILL CONSIDER THIS DRAFT TO BE THE BEST BASIS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

13. IT IS THE UNWILLINGNESS OF OUR WESTERN PARTNERS TO ENGAGE IN THE SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THIS PROPOSAL AS WELL AS THEIR INSISTENCE ON THE SCHEME OF REDUCTION ORIENTED TOWARDS UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES WHICH HAS MADE AN AGREEMENT IMPOSSIBLE.

14. DESPITE THESE DIFFICULTIES, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TRIED TO HELP MOVE THINGS AHEAD AND CAME OUT WITH THE LIMITED AND COMPROMISE PARTIAL OFFER AIMED AT OBTAINING IMMEDIATE RESULTS IN 1975.

15. TO THIS PROPOSAL WE HEARD A HASTY "NO". HOWEVER, HAVING ENTERED THE YEAR 1975 WE STILL CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL PRACTICABLE, AND WOULD MOST EARNESTLY URGE ITS SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

16. FINALLY, TOWARDS THE END OF THE LAST ROUND WE PUT FORWARD A STILL SIMPLER PROPOSAL ASKING NOT FOR A REDUCTION BUT FOR NOT INCREASING FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00035 02 OF 04 071049Z

CENTRAL EUROPE FOR THE DURATION OF NEGOTIATIONS. THOUGH NOT ENVISAGING REDUCTION PROPER, THIS PROPOSAL IS MEANT TO CREATE CONDITIONS MOST PROPITIOUS FOR A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. IN NO DEGREE DOES IT SUPPLANT PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTION OR IS INTENDED TO DETRACT US FROM THE PROPER SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD HAVE UNDENIABLE IMMEDIATE BENEFIT-

CIAL EFFECTS ON OUR NEGOTIATIONS, ON GENERAL PROCESS OF
DETENTE AND THE PUBLIC OPINION. THE TEMPORARY NATURE OF THE
PROPOSED UNDERTAKING SHOULD DISPEL MISAPPREHENSIONS ABOUT
ITS POSSIBLE EFFECT IN PREJUDGING THE ATTITUDE OF ANY PARTY.
WE SUBMIT THAT THE APPROVAL OF THIS SIMPLE PROPOSAL INDEED
REQUIRES A MINIMUM OF GOOD WILL. WE ARE THEREFORE SURPRISED
AT THE NEGATIVE REACTION SO FAR SIGNALLED FROM THE WESTERN
SIDE. WE SHOULD LIKE TO IMPRESS UPON WESTERN DELEGATIONS
THE VALUE OF MAKING JUST A SMALL STEP IF THE BIG ONE CANNOT
BE YET TAKEN. I SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ONCE AGAIN EAR-
NESTLY APPEAL TO OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES THAT THIS PROPOSAL
SHOULD BE MET WITH THEIR CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE.

17. I HAVE RECALLED THE THREE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES TO POINT TO THE WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES FOR
AGREEMENT THAT THEY CONTAIN. ALL ARE DICTATED BY SINCERE DE-
SIRE OF PROGRESS. ALL ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL
CRITERIA ACCRUING FROM PRINCIPLES COMMONLY ACCEPTED.
HOWEVER, AS WE SEE, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS - FAR FROM A
CONSTRUCTIVE CONSIDERATION OF THIS GAMUT OF OFFERS - PERSIST
IN CONFINING THEMSELVES TO THEIR OWN HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE AND
UNJUST SCHEME. ONE MAY DEFINITELY CONCLUDE THIS FROM THE
LAST STATEMENT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM. HE CONCENTRATED ON PRESENTING TO US AGAIN
THE KNOWN WESTERN BLUEPRINT ON REDUCTIONS AS THE ONLY
"WORKABLE FRAMEWORK" FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

18. WE HAVE ALWAYS CAREFULLY STUDIED ALL WESTERN PRO-
POSALS AND WE HAVE JUDGED THEM BY THE SAME OBJECTIVE CRITERIA
THAT WE HAD APPLIED TO OUR OWN PROPOSALS.

19. THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS DO NOT DENY THAT THEIR PRIN-
CIPAL AIM IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO CHANGE THE EXISTING
CORRELATION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN NATO'S FAVOUR, UN-
DER THE DECEITFUL CONCEPT OF ESTABLISHING THE COMMON CEILING
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00035 02 OF 04 071049Z

IN GROUND FORCES MANPOWER OF THE NATO AND THE SOCIALIST COUN-
TRIES. THE COMMON CEILING OF GROUND FORCES MANPOWER IS ELE-
VATED TO THE ONLY DETERMINANT OF MILITARY BALANCE WITH TOTAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00035 03 OF 04 071106Z

20

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 066093

P R 070940Z FEB 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 828

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0035

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT ONLY TO NATO DEPT,
TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

IGNORANCE OF ALL OTHER FACTORS HEAVILY WEIGHING ON THIS
BALANCE, IN PARTICULAR SUCH AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AIR FORCE
CAPABILITIES, STATE OF ARMAMENTS IN GENERAL AND THE RELATIVE
MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL OF THE COUNTRIES WITHIN
THE AREA.

20. THIS CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING IS ALSO MEANT TO
PROVIDE EXCUSE FOR THE WESTERN INSISTENCE THAT THE GROUND
FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE REDUCED IN A MUCH
GREATER PROPORTION THAN THOSE OF NATO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00035 03 OF 04 071106Z

21. IT IS EVIDENT THAT SUCH POSITION, EQUAL TO THE DEMAND
FOR UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES, IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE
AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. IT IS THEREFORE

TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

22. THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS ALSO TRY TO CONVERT INTO A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THE UNWILLINGNESS OF SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO UNDERTAKE CONCRETE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS, THOUGH NOTHING IN THE AGREED PRINCIPLES ALLOWS FOR SUCH BIASED APPROACH, OBVIOUSLY MEANT TO SERVE UNILATERAL NATO INTERESTS AND SPECIFICALLY THOSE OF THE LARGEST NATO STATE IN THE AREA. THIS CLEARLY CONTRAVENES THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY. IT HAS BECOME THE REAL HINDRANCE ON THE WAY TO ANY PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. INDEED, AS THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS HAVE SHOWN, THE NATO STATES FIND IT POSSIBLE TO DEMAND A LARGELY UNILATERAL SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE LARGEST COMPONENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THE AREA, WHILE NOT ONLY PRACTICALLY EXCLUDING FROM REDUCTIONS THE LARGEST COMPONENT OF THEIR FORCES, BUT EVEN TAKING STEPS TO INCREASE THAT COMPONENT.

23. AS WE SEE FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE WESTERN STATES INTEND FURTHER TO MAINTAIN THESE HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL AND UNACCEPTABLE POINTS OF THEIR POSITION. ONLY NEXT TO THIS IT IS CLAIMED THAT THE SO-CALLED MODIFICATIONS INTRODUCED TO THE WESTERN PLAN HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT "LEGITIMATE CONCERNS" OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON SOME OTHER ASPECTS. THIS CLAIM IS HOWEVER ERRONEOUS.

24. IT IS INDEED STRANGE TO HEAR THE CONTENTION THAT OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES HAVE MADE ALMOST A SACRIFICE AND A GREAT CONCESSION IN THE RECENT MODIFICATIONS BY PROVIDING FOR THE EVENTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION, AT SOME DISTANT DATE, OF NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THESE TALKS. YET, IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY UNTHINKABLE FOR EQUAL AND SOVEREIGN STATES TO CONTEMPLATE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION WITH THE A PRIORI ASSUMPTION THAT FOR MANY YEARS TO COME A MAJORITY OF PARTICIPANTS WILL TURN OUT TO BE ONLY ONLOOKERS OF THIS PROCESS. HAD THIS LOGIC CONSEQUENCE, AND SHOULD WE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00035 03 OF 04 071106Z

ACCEPT SUCH A PREMISE, THEN THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE VIENNA TALKS WOULD HAVE TO REDEFINE THE OBJECTIVE OF THESE TALKS, THE STATUS OF PARTICIPANTS, AND PERHAPS EVEN THE AREA. I THINK, NO ONE PRESENT HERE WOULD SUGGEST SUCH A REVISION OF THE ALREADY REACHED IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS ON THESE MATTERS.

25. THE WESTERN ALLEGEDLY COMPROMISE MOVE IN PROMISING TO TAKE PART IN EVENTUAL REDUCTIONS BY ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THE TALKS, EXCEPT LUXEMBURG REPRESENTS NOTHING MORE THAN A DELAYED AND GENERALLY TERMED ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THEIR STATUS OF DIRECT PARTICI-

PANTS.

26. LET US NOW MORE CLOSELY LOOK AT THE VALUE OF SOME OF THE WESTERN MODIFICATIONS.

27. IT IS PROPOSED THAT IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT INSTEAD OF REDUCTIONS THE 6 WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES UNDER A COLLECTIVE NATO CEILING NOT TO INCREASE GROUND FORCES UNTIL A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT. THUS, UNDER THE WESTERN SCHEME THE CONCEPT OF NON-INCREASE SERVES A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT PURPOSE THAN THE IDEA OF NON-INCREASE IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES LATEST PROPOSAL. WE PROPOSE IT AS A TEMPORARY COMMITMENT, CONDUCIVE TO A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE WESTERN STATES WOULD USE IT TO REPLACE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS OF THE 6 WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, ENABLING THEM TO ESCAPE FROM SUCH OBLIGATIONS FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL YEARS.

28. ANOTHER POINT IS THAT THIS COMMITMENT WOULD FAIL TO IMPOSE PRECISE LIMITATIONS ON PARTICULAR DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THEREFORE, IT IS AMBIGUOUS AND EVEN MISLEADING. AT THE TIME WHEN THE USSR IS SUPPOSED TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING ITS FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES WOULD PRESERVE THE RIGHT EVEN TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES. AS RECENT EXAMPLES SHOW, SUCH POSSIBILITY IS NOT JUST A THEORETICAL HYPOTHESIS.

29. YET NO NATION CAN AFFORD TO RISK THE ACCEPTANCE OF A SCHEME WHICH IMPOSES OBLIGATIONS AFFECTING ITS SECURITY AND, AT THE SAME TIME, DISREGARDS THE FACT THAT OTHER STATES WOULD NOT ONLY BE FREE BUT WOULD ACTUALLY CONTEMPLATE TO EXPAND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00035 03 OF 04 071106Z

THEIR POTENTIAL UNDER THE COVER OF INTERNATIONAL REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE VERY ESSENCE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY DEMANDS THAT OBLIGATIONS SHOULD BE EQUIVALENT. THIS, IN OUR VIEW, REMAINS TO BE THE BONA FIDE PRINCIPLE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00035 04 OF 04 071117Z

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 066211

P R 070940Z FEB 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0829

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0035

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT ONLY TO NATO DEPT,
TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

30. HAD THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS REALLY DESIRED TO MEET THE SOCIALIST STATES' CONCERNS IN A COMPROMISE MANNER, THEY WOULD HAVE STIPULATED IN CLEAR-CUT TERMS THE OBLIGATIONS OF 6 WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES ALONG WITH THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 4 SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, WHO FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE VIENNA TALKS SPECIFIED THEIR READINESS TO DO SO.

31. IN RECENT WESTERN STATEMENTS A GREAT IMPORTANCE IS ASCRIBED TO THE LATEST MODIFICATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00035 04 OF 04 071117Z

ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT FORCES SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT.

32. WE ARE BEING TOLD THAT BY PROPOSING THE EXTENSION OF THE COLLECTIVE FREEZE TO COVER AIR FORCE PERSONNEL THE WESTERN STATES ARE MEETING OUR CONCERNS.

33. IN ALL FRANKNESS, WE WELCOME SIGNS OF THINKING

AMONG WESTERN POLICY PLANNERS WHICH PROMISE TO EXTEND FUTURE WESTERN COMMITMENTS TO THE COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THE GROUND FORCES. WE NOTE THAT OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES BEGIN TO APPRECIATE THE STRENGTH AND THE VALIDITY OF ARGUMENTS TO THIS EFFECT, CONTINUOUSLY EXPOUNDED BY THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS IN THESE TALKS.

34. HOWEVER, THE WESTERN POSITION ON THIS ISSUE STILL REMAINS FAR FROM SATISFACTORY BECAUSE THIS LATEST MODIFICATION DOES NOT OFFER TO CHANGE THE UNACCEPTABLE OVERALL WESTERN SCHEME OF UNEQUITABLE REDUCTIONS.

35. THE WELL FOUNDED ATTITUDE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAS BEEN THAT ANY PROGRAMME OF REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE A COMPREHENSIVE ONE. WE GAVE EXTENSIVE EXPLANATION OF OUR CONCERNS SUPPORTING THIS POSTULATE AND GIVING PROFOUND MOTIVES OF POLITICAL, MILITARY AND HISTORICAL NATURE.

36. WE WOULD LIKE TO BE CLEAR ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE. WHAT THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE REALLY CONCERNED WITH IS NOT JUST A LIMITED PROVISIO ON NON-INCREASE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER, WHICH DOES NOT PREVENT A GROWTH IN COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF AIR FORCES. WHAT WE ARE CONCERNED WITH IS NOT JUST A FREEZE ON AIR FORCE. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THIS IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES AMASSED IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE EFFECTIVELY REDUCED TOGETHER WITH GROUND FORCES. SUPPORTED BY THE POPULAR PRESSURES IN MANY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WE ALSO SHALL NOT CEASE DEMANDING THE REDUCTIN OF THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS, CONCENTRATED IN THE AREA - THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

37. POLISH DELEGATION HAS CLEARLY ENOUGH INDICATED WHAT ARE THE REAL AND LEGITIMATE CONCERNS FOR POLAND AND HER
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00035 04 OF 04 071117Z

ALLIES, IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND ANY EUROPEANSECURITY SET-UP. LET IT BE SAID ONCE AGAIN, IN THE YEAR 1975 WHICH WE WOULD SINCERELY WISH TO SEE THE PRACTICAL BEGINNING OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS, THAT WE ARE READY TO TAKE PART IN THIS PROCESS, EITHER UNDER THE GENERAL PLAN OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973 OR, TO START WITH, UNDER A MORE LIMITED INITIAL STEP. EQUALLY, WE ARE PREPARED TO BE SIGNATORIES OF THE JOINT DECLARATION ON NON-INCREASE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA DURING THE TALKS.

38. HOWEVER, THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF OUR NATION AND THOSE OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY DEMAND THAT OUR READINESS SHOULD BE RECIPROCATED BY THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IN ORDER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT, WE NEED THE RENOUNCEMENT BY THE WESTERN STATES OF THEIR PLAN TO CHANGE

THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF MILITARY FORCES AND IN EFFECT TO UNDERMINE, INSTEAD OF STRENGTHENING, THE EXISTING STABILITY. WE ALSO NEED THE UNAMBIGUOUS DECLARATION OF DEFINITE COMMITMENTS ON THE PART OF ALL WESTERN POWERS, INCLUDING THE 6 OF THEM WHO ACCOUNT FOR AS MUCH AS THREE QUARTERS OF NATO FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. BEFORE SUCH COMMITMENTS ARE SPELLED OUT WITH SUFFICIENT PRECISION BY THESE WESTERN POWERS, AS TO: WHOSE AND WHAT FORCES ARE TO BE REDUCED AND WHEN, THERE IS NO USE IN PERSUADING US THAT OUR CONCERNS HAVE BEEN MET HALF WAY.

39. THE MODIFICATIONS OF THE WESTERN ATTITUDE ONLY CONFIRM THE CORRECTNESS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS AND PROMPT US TO FURTHER PERSUADE THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS THAT THE PATH TO A COMMONLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION RUNS ELSEWHERE. THIS PATH IS CLEARLY INDICATED IN THE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, USSR AND POLAND.
END TEXT.RESOR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, NEGOTIATIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, MEETINGS, MILITARY POLICIES, MILITARY PLANS, SPEECHES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ellisoob
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MBFRV00035
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750045-0544
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750263/aaaacegi.tel
Line Count: 620
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ellisoob
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 MAR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31 MAR 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <15 SEP 2003 by ellisoob>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: POLISH PRESENTATIION AT FEB 6 PLENARY SESSION
TAGS: PARM, PL, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006